Kyoto Protocol: the contents
We must say that the Kyoto Protocol, like all international agreements, presents the major limitation of the "non-enforceability." Several eminent jurists believe that international law is not a true "right", because the penalties to the violation of the rules can not be imposed on the Member by any organ independent from them. Like all international agreements, its success depends largely on the political will of the States which have ratified it.
We also say that the Kyoto Protocol is the result of a laborious process of mediation has thus also rules formulated in a generic way that can lend itself to different interpretations.
Because of its complexity and its "revolutionary", the Protocol has taken 10 years to be designed, prepared, approved and ratified. National obligations of reduction were determined on the basis of 1990 data, therefore, for countries such as China and India, which at the time were considered to be developing countries, it was no obligation. For the period after 2012, it will be necessary that the obligations of limitation are also provided for these countries.
The Protocol pursues modest compared to the demands imposed by climate change and described in detail by the IPCC. Nevertheless, it is a first step that could be able to generate virtuous behavior in the participating States, but also in those that are left out of the 'agreement.
Obligations differentiated by country
That 'being said, we enter into the merits of the Kyoto Protocol, saying at the outset that one of its main features is the distinction of the countries in three areas (distinction, special attention is drawn up on the basis of the data of 1990 and inclusive of all countries that in 1997 had signed the agreement, including those that then did not ratify it).
A. The industrialized countries are responsible for the vast majority of emissions that are now required to reduce their overall emissions by 5.2% compared to global emissions measured in 1990. This objective will be achieved within the period 2008-2012
• The ratified: Austria, Belgium, Canada, European Community, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain and Ireland North, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
• They have not yet ratified: Australia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, United States of America
B. The countries in transition, for which are set caps on emissions, in some cases exceeded the emission levels measured in 1990.
• The ratified: Bulgaria, Estonia, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary
• They have not yet ratified: Croatia, Ukraine
C. The countries in the developing world to which it is entitled to pursue its own industrial development. It follows that they are not subject to particular constraints and will have more room for maneuver
• All countries have ratified the group: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Cyprus, Colombia, Cook, South Korea, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Djibouti, Jordan, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, India, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Marshall, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Solomon, Samoa, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam
For each country the first two groups the Protocol provides precisely quantified targets for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to be achieved by 2012. These objectives are determined by a percentage of the measured emissions in 1990. For example, the goal is for the EU 92, or 92% of emissions compared to 1990, ie a reduction of 8% in that year. For Norway the goal is 101, or emissions may be increased up to 1% more 'than in 1990.
The object
The greenhouse gases identified by the Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
The reference gas is CO2, other gases are measured in "CO2 equivalent" through a precise exchange ratio.
Emission sources and means of action
Emissions of greenhouse gases depend on activities such as:
• energy production (eg fuel combustion emissions and emissions from fuels)
• industrial processes (eg chemical, minerals)
• agriculture (agricultural waste incineration, controlled burning, enteric fermentation, manure management, etc.)
• waste management (solid waste, waste, waste water treatment)
To reduce emissions you can 'intervene through domestic actions of many areas and on many aspects, through energy saving policies, promotion of renewable energy, waste recycling, optimization of production processes, technological innovation, absorption of CO2 by the carbon sink, etc..
Based on the principle that it is not important where emissions reductions are implemented, because the problem is global, the Protocol has prepared three special tools called flexible mechanisms:
• Emissions trading (exchange of emission allowances)
Establishment of a market for "emission permits", in virtue 'of which the States can buy "virtual reductions" in emissions from other states that are able to reduce their emissions to a level higher than that required of them by the Protocol. The mechanism can 'only be adopted by the countries for which the Protocol has set targets for the reduction or limitation. The Protocol also provides for the possibility of establishing national emission or macro-regional markets, which the European Union has decided to do, as we will see shortly.
• Joint Implementation (Joint Implementation)
Agreements between industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition in virtue 'of which an industrialized country (guest) scores a development project with a country with economies in transition (the host). If the project produces fewer emissions than a similar project carried out in the absence of the mechanism industrialized country will receive an amount of credits equal to the difference.
• Clean Development Mechanism (Clean Development Mechanism)
Agreements between industrialized countries and developing the virtues' of which an industrialized country (guest) scores a development project with a developing country (the host). That produces fewer emissions than a similar project carried out in the absence of the mechanism. The industrialized country will receive an amount of credits equal to that difference.
Sanctions
There are two types of sanctions for Member States that do not succeed in achieving the objectives of reduction or limitation they set.
1. The percentage amount in excess of the targets set, increased by 30%, it should be combined with a percentage of the amount of emission reductions planned for the second phase of implementation of the Protocol (the one under discussion for the period after 2012)
2. The defaulting Member State may 'also be excluded from participation in one or more' flexible mechanisms.
It is all internal to the Protocol and sanctions that can only operate if there is agreement for the period after 2012.
The second penalty is extravagant, as well as to punish the state contradicts the assumption of the flexible mechanisms under which it is not where the emission reduction is achieved. If they can not 'understand the meaning only the premise that in the debate pre-Kyoto flexible mechanisms were seen almost as a kind of "loophole" for states that do not wish to revise their business models. The state sanctioned then it is forced to operate emission reductions in their own home, without resorting to the more 'economic projects outside the national borders.
EU Emission Trading Directive and the fine European
In the face of mild sanctions prescribed by the Protocol, it is, however, 'said that there is a penalty much more' convincing in the EU.
The EU has issued the EU Directive 2003/87/EC for the implementation of the Protocol, establishing a market of regional emissions (EU area) and requiring Member States to the preparation of a national plan with the allocation of permits issued to individual plants of certain sectors (energy transformation, production-ferrous mineral processing, cement, glass, ceramics, paper mills)
The operators of these plants will, under certain conditions to participate in the market for emission certificates, selling or buying certificates depending on the emissions emitted.
For every ton equivalent CO2 emitted in excess of the operators, they will have to pay a fine of 40 Euros in 2005-2007 and and a fine of EUR 100 per tonne in subsequent periods. It is a sanction extremely important, especially if we think that the value that is expected to have a ton of CO2 emission permits on the market (opening soon) should be between 8 and 10 Euros.
The penalty is equal to about 4 or 5 times the market value of a corresponding certificate issuance.
This penalty, in addition to being a further stimulus for EU countries to implement their reduction targets, it could also have important effects on the market of permits.
In fact, if a large number of operators of European States were to end up with higher emissions than emission allowances established for them, they would be highly motivated to appeal to the mass purchase of emission permits on the market and it would push up the price ( the emission permit market is more 'convenient fine if the price remains below 40 euro/100 euro).
Ultimately, the great weight of the EU countries in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, together with the presence of the "fine European" could significantly drive up the price of emissions permits, well above the estimated 8-10 euro per tonne for the initial phase of the market. The result could then be a strong stimulus to Member emission reduction, because the cost of necessary renovations at the level of production processes and consumption patterns would be more 'down the price of emission permits, due to the effects of the "fine European ".
This possible scenario is a small guarantee that gives me hope that in the end at least the EU countries fail to reach the Kyoto targets, because they are forced by the high price of pollution to comply with the imperative of reducing externalities.
Prospects
Soon we will officially open the negotiations to discuss the post-2012 period, and will be essential to reach an agreement with all countries that in 1990 were considered in developing countries that have experienced tremendous growth in recent years.
Could also be decisive policy changes within countries such as the USA and Australia, where the opposition is in favor of the Kyoto Protocol, while the current governments have decided not to ratify it.
The scientific debate between those who believe that climate change is caused by human activities and those who believe such baseless claim was virtually shut down in the scientific world with the general recognition on the part of almost all of the experts of the apparent impact of the human factor on Climate Change (there are also natural factors). Similarly, the hazards associated with climate change (rising temperatures, melting glaciers, increased intensity of extreme natural events leading to great risks to human societies) are not subject to specific claims by the scientific community.
On the political level, in the last G8 also the Government of the United States, after long hesitation, acknowledged the impact of human activities on climate change, while preferring to stay out of Kyoto and less demanding research partnerships with other countries.
Paradoxically, however, 'the debate is still open to the media and the national political stage, where the comfortable and reassuring argument that climate change depend only on natural factors continues to be offered and to receive a certain credit, even though they are few, and generally little authoritative scientists who endorse.
The Italian situation
Italy is late. The National Plan to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases that illustrates the strategies that Italy intends to promote in order to implement the Kyoto Protocol, and the national plan for the allocation of emission allowances (NAP) have raised a hornet's nest of criticism from the environmental groups who have judged totally inadequate.
In particular, the national plan for the allocation of emission allowances (NAP), imposed by the aforementioned Directive on Emissions Trading in order to identify emission permits for large industrial and energy plants operating in the country should be the main tool of a EU state for the control of greenhouse gas emissions on its own territory. To process it were the Ministry for Productive Activities and the Ministry for the Environment. To read the version initially submitted to the European Commission, we note that the National Plan, far from imposing a reduction, even split instead an overall increase in emissions in the order of about 22-23% compared to 1990 in the areas affected by the measure.
The government's intention seems to be to make substantial use of the purchase of emission certificates and other flexible mechanisms.
The European Commission, while not rejecting the Plan, awarded him the initials NC (not classified), asking Italy to drastically reduce the emission ceilings by sector. Last February, Italy submitted to the European Commission a supplement to the NAP, containing a list of 1,210 Italian plants which will be allocated allowances for the years 2005, 2006, 2007.
19/11/2005
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Source:
Italian version of CercaGeometra.it